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The rationale for international portfolio diversification is that it offers benefits beyond what 
can be gained through domestic investments. The idea is based on low or negative correlation be-
tween international securities returns. Early literature demonstrated that international diversification 
among developed markets rewarded investors with higher returns, as correlation between developed 
markets was low
1.  More recent studies, however, have more often emphasized the loss of diversifica-
tion benefits among developed markets
2. As a consequence, the focus has shifted to emerging econo-
mies, in which equity returns did not go in tandem with the Western world, and thus attract interna-
tional investors. While the research on the existence of international diver sification produced mixed 
results, there has been a general agreement on the fact that correlation between stock mark et prices 
increases during market downturns, reducing the benefits when they are mostly needed.
3 This conta-
gion effect affects both developed and emerging markets. The developments on international equity 
markets since the outburst of the subprime bubble  has confirmed the argument of increased correla-
tion among global equity markets in economic downturns. Additionally, the enhanced integration of 
the economies of various countries due to increased globalisation has intensified the co-movement of 
their equity returns. 
Research on diversification possibilities in Eastern Europe (EE) has been so far scarce. The 
reason is the relatively brief existence of its stock markets. Existing studies confirmed, however, the 
attractiveness of these markets to foreign investors. In an early analysis of Central and Eastern Eur o-
pean markets Schroeder concluded that inclusion of some  of their countries stock indices in an in-
vestment portfolio may offer important diversification potential.
4 Later, Gilmore and McManus con-
firmed the view of no long-term relationship between major equity markets in Central Europe and the 
USA.
5 This argument was supported by Platev and Kanaryan in a more recent analysis of four Eastern 
European markets: Russian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish.
6  
The global financial turmoil rocked all countries in Eastern Europe, yet not all with the same 
force. The entry in the EU of twelve Eastern European countries, together with the success in stabilis-
ing and reforming their economies, has resulted in increased economic and financial integration with 
Western Europe. This stimulated massive cash inflows to the new  EU member states, in the form of 
FDI, bank loans, and portfolio investment. During the good times, it helped Emerging Europe to catch 
up with advanced economies. However, when the global economic climate deteriorated, the increased 
integration made EE more vulnerable to external global shocks.  This vulnerability could quickly be 
observed in their equity markets, which followed the markets of Western Europe.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the developments in the stock markets of Eastern European 
countries before and during the subprime crisis and to evaluate the hypothesis of disappearing portfo-
lio diversification opportunities in Eastern Europe.  The paper concentrates on the stock markets of 
eleven EE countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ro-
                                       
1 B.H. Solnik, Why not diversify internationally rather than domestically?,  “Financial Analysts Journal”, 1974,  
30, H. Levy, M. Sarnat, International diversification of investment portfolios, “The American Economic Re-
view”,  1970, 60(4). 
2 R.A. Sinquefield, Where are the gains from international diversification?, “Financial Analysts Journal”, 1996, 
52(1), I. Meric, G. Meric, Co-movements of European equity markets before and after the 1987 crash,  “Multi-
national Finance Journal”, 1997, 2. Nonetheless, there are authors who argue that the benefits still exist, e.g. M. 
Statman, J. Scheid, Global diversification, 2004, available at Social Science Research Network. 
3 E.g. R.A.J. Campbell, C. S. Forbes, K.C.G. Koedijk, P. Kofman,  Diversification meltdown or just fat tails?, 
EFA Zurich Meetings, 2006, available at Social Science Research Network. 
4 M. Schroeder, Investments in CEE capital markets: Benefits from diversification and optimal portfolios, in The 
New Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. M. Schroeder, Springer, Berlin 2001, 465-481. 
5 C.G. Gilmore, G.M. McManus, International portfolio diversification: US and Central European equity mar-
kets, “Emerging Markets Review”, 2002. 
6 P. Platev, N. Kanaryan, Stock market crises and portfolio diversification in Central and Eastern Europe, 
“Managerial Finance”, 2006, 32(5).  
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mania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
7 Their attractiveness in terms of diversification benefits will be 
assessed from the point of view of a US investor. Monthly equity index data in USD for each county 
was obtained from Morgan Stanley Capital Index except for Latvia and Lithuania whose indices come 
from NASDAQ OMX Baltic. The main period of analysis covers January 2003 to July 2009. 
The paper is structured as follows:  the next section provides an analysis of stock markets in 
EE before the crisis and a brief  overview of macroeconomic fundamentals in the analysed countries, 
with an attempt to identify their potential vulnerabilities to external shocks.  Section III concentrates 
on the impact of the crisis on Emerging European equity markets. Section IV explores diversification 
opportunities in EE and section V concludes. 
Through the application of correlation analysis, Markowitz mean variance approach and port-
folio optimisation strategy based on maximisation of excess return to volatility ratio it is shown  that 
diversification opportunities for a US investor in the  Eastern European  region have largely disap-
peared. 
 
Equity markets in Eastern Europe 
Previous studies found that a stock market’s vulnerability to a crisis depends on various fac-
tors. This section analyses the stock markets in EE with an attempt to isolate individual countries’ 
vulnerabilities within three areas: stock market development, economic fundamentals, and sensitivity 
to worldwide market movements. 
  Stock market development 
Equity markets in Eastern Europe, which had to be built from scratch at the beginning of the 
last decade, afterwards grew rapidly. Even though the banking sector remains the main source of fi-
nance in this region, the importance of the stock market has grown significantly. The rapid growth 
paired with reforms in the financial sector drew in foreign investors who were rewarded with attrac-
tive and stable rates of return for accepting higher risk. However, due to globalisation of financial 
markets, the equity markets of the EE region were not able to withstand the collapse of global stock 
market indices in the second half of 2007 (even though their economies were quite resistant at the 
beginning). 
Figure 1 shows the development of selected global equity market indices from January 1997 
until July 2009. Interestingly, the MSCI index of Eastern European Emerging markets (EMEE) - just 
as the Emerging Markets (EM) Index covering emerging economies in other parts of the world  - 
moved in the opposite direction to developed market indices and the World index at the end of the 
1990s. This could explain previous research findings in support of the diversification benefits in EE. 
This trend, however, changed at the beginning of this century, since when the EMEE index has gone 
in tandem with the developed world. Another important observation is that the fall of the EMEE index 
in the crisis was much more severe than the losses of the main world exchanges. There are several 
reasons for this. At the beginning, the decline of Eastern European stock markets was more a reaction 
to the behaviour of world stock markets. But it also resulted from the deteriorating financial situation 
of international investors present in the region, who were very often forced to leave the market in 
order to improve their current liquidity. Finally, the deteriorating prospects for EE countries in view 




                                       
7 The countries will be referred to as Eastern European (EE) or Emerging European interchangeably in the text. 
The term “Emerging Europe” in the study will cover all the analysed countries, even though countries like Ro-
mania, Ukraine and Bulgaria are often referred to as frontier markets (MSCI Barra). 
8 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kryzys na rynkach finansowych. Wyzwania stojace przed spolkami, PWC, 2009. 
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Figure 1. Selected Equity Market Indices (January 1, 1997 = 100, USD). 
 
Source: MSCI Barra. 
Note: EM – Emerging Markets. 
The economic slowdown and the withdrawal of foreign capital resulted in declines in market 
capitalisation of local companies. Table 1 provides information about the size of the individual mar-
kets in 2007 and 2008. Germany, the UK, and the US were added for purpose of comparison.   




Number of listed companies 
2007  2008 








ber of listed 
companies 
Eastern Europe 
Bucharest SE  21,523.88  6,474.07  0  54  2  64 
Budapest SE  31,527.90  13,325.60  1  41  2  43 
Bulgarian SE  14,820.75  6,371.03  9  369  7  399 
Ljubljana SE  19,740.12  8,468.42  0  87  0  84 
Prague SE  47,987.44  29,615.12  2  32  1  29 
Warsaw SE  144,323.31  65,177.59  105  375  93  458 
NASDAQ OMX Tallin  4,105.37  1,403.21  n.a.  18  n.a.  18 
NASDAQ OMX Riga  2,098.48  1,166.43  n.a.  41  n.a.  35 
NASDAQ OMX Vilnius  6,891.85  2,607.85  n.a.  40  n.a.  n.a. 
Russian SE  1,021,145.67  281,801.34  n.a.  328  n.a.  314 
Ukrainian SE  75,927.71  17,282.00  n.a.  276  n.a.  251 
Advanced economies  
Deutsche Börse  1,439,955.31  797,063.00  65  866  5  832 
London SE  2,634,577.30  1,352,327.00  268  3,307  73  3,096 
US  13,197,925.89  10,716,314.25  296  5,133  57  5,130 
Source: FESE, World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2008, The World Bank,  Washington 2008, World 
Bank, World Development Indicators: 2009,  The World Bank,  Washington 2009.  
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In 2007 most of the countries reached their highest levels in terms of market capitalisation. The 
leader in the region was Russia, where market capitalisation of €1.02 billion was approaching the 
level of Germany and Spain. It was followed by the Warsaw, Ukrainian and Prague stock exchanges. 
The financial crisis brought great declines in 2008. Then, Ukrainian, Russian, and Romanian stocks 
suffered most losing around 70% of their value compared to the previous year.  
The global economic crisis and the loss of confidence in the capital markets had important im-
plications for companies looking for capital. This was equally true in the USA as in European coun-
tries. European exchanges experienced a significant slowdown in the number of IPOs in 2008. Ac-
cording to PricewaterhouseCoopers, in 2008 a total of 337 companies decided to go public, which was 
a slump from 819 in 2007. The total value of IPOs fell by 83%. The same trend was in the volume and 
value of the US IPOs, which fell respectively by 81% and 60%.
9  
The Warsaw Stock Exchange, with 105 IPOs in 2007, was a definite leader in the  EE region, 
even getting ahead of the German Stock Exchange. Even though the Polish stock market was hit badly 
by the crisis, it maintained its top position not only in Eastern Europe, but in Europe in general  in 
2008. In the same year, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was also leading in the region in term s of the 
number of companies listed, with a total of 458 companies. With the capitalisation of €65.18 billion, it 
outperformed such developed market exchanges as Vienna or Athens. In other countries of the region, 
IPOs were almost non-existent that year. The slowdown continued in the first half of 2009, when ac-
tivity could be observed in only a few exchanges with Warsaw again at the top. 
Even though EE stock markets have developed rapidly in recent years to relatively large sizes, their 
liquidity still lags behind the major developed markets. According to figure 2, Hungarian, Czech, Russian, 
and Polish markets were the ones with the greatest liquidity in the region in 2007.  Even though they are 
still far away from British, American or German markets, they have already reached the size and/or liquid-
ity of smaller European exchanges, like those of Vienna, Athens, or Lisbon. On the other hand, the Ukrain-
ian, Latvian, Slovenian and Lithuanian stock exchanges can be described as the most illiquid.  
 



































Market Capitalisation  (% of GDP)
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2008, ...op.cit. 
                                       
9 PricewaterhouseCoopers, IPO Watch Europe. Review of the year 2008, PWC, 2009.  
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  Economic fundamentals 
Several studies confirmed that vulnerability of a country’s stock market to a crisis depends 
not only on financial market development, but also on its economic fundamentals.
10 Table 2 gives an 
overview of selected macroeconomic indicators for the analysed countries.  
Table 2. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (2007). 
  
GDP 
growth   
(%) 





account balance       
(% of GDP) 
Domestic 
credit  





Bulgaria  6.2  31.3  5.7  -22.0  66.8  2.0 
Czech Republic  6.6  12.8  2.1  -1.8  47.7  2.1 
Estonia  6.3  13.6  3.7  -18.0  96.1  -2.9 
Hungary  1.1  9.5  5.5  -4.9  61.5  3.2 
Latvia  10.3  13.5  5.1  -23.9  93.9  -2.1 
Lithuania  8.8  21.7  1.6  -14.8  61.2  -1.6 
Poland  6.6  13.0  2.3  -4.4  39.7  3.9 
Romania  6.0  33.9  13.8  -13.9  35.8  2.3 
Russia  8.1  44.2  12.9  5.9  39.0  -3.1 
Slovenia  6.8  8.4  4.5  -4.9  79.0  1.7 
Ukraine  7.6  50.8  8.5  -3.7  58.8  -6.5 
 Advanced economies  
Germany  2.5  n.a.  1.6  7.6   105.5  n.a 
UK  3.0  15.9  2.8  -2.8  190.0  2.4 
USA  2.0  12.1  2.7  -5.3  210.1  5.3 
Source: EBRD, World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2008, ...op.cit. 
The data reveals substantial differences in macroeconomic policies among EE countries. Indi-
cators of overheating, such as large current account deficit, fast credit growth and high inflation, were 
visible in 2007 in the countries which subsequently were most affected by the crisis. The transition 
region has undergone a rapid expansion of the financial sector in recent years, which included high 
growth in lending at rates that were unsustainable. The funding of credit growth, and possible nega-
tive implications of the decline in such funding for GDP growth, could have been a cause for concern 
for foreign investors in Eastern Europe.
11 Many of the countries experienced serious problems with 
current account deficit (especially the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria), financed largely by 
borrowing of subsidiaries of foreign banks from their parents.  Relatively cheap foreign funding re-
sulted in rapid credit growth especially in Ukraine, Russia and Romania. The same countries were 
struggling with inflation which amounted to 8.5%, 12.9%, and 13.8%, respectively. These countries 
could be the most vulnerable to the crisis and the decline in the ir stock prices could be  the deepest. 
There were, however, countries where sound economic fundamentals could make their markets more 
                                       
10 E. Fama, Stock returns, real returns, inflation, and money, “American Economic Review”, 1981, 71, N. Chen, 
F. Zhang, Correlations, trades and stock returns of the Pacific-Basin markets,  “Pacific-Basin Finance Journal”, 
1997, 5, International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Financial stress and deleveraging. 
Microfinancial implications and policy, IMF, Washington 2008,  R.G. Bowman, K. F. Chan, M.R. Comer, Con-
tagion in world equity markets and the Asian economic crisis, 2007, available at Social Science Research Net-
work. 
11 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe. Addressing the crisis, IMF, Washington 
2009.  
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resistant to the crisis. A striking example is the Czech Republic, with a low current account deficit, 
relatively low interest rates, and consequently foreign currency bank lending, and low inflation. 
An additional determinant of international investment decision making could be the country 
risk. According to Euromoney Country Risk Poll, the safest places to invest within EE in September 
2007 were Slovenia (26) and the Czech Republic (37).
12 Unstable political situations in Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Russia, as well as poor access to bank finance placed the se countries at the bottom of 
the EE country risk list.  
  Sensitivity to worldwide market movements 
Previous research documents a relationship between a country’s stock market returns in a cri-
sis and the country’s sensitivity to worldwide market movements.
13 According to Roll, the relative 
movement of each market in the crisis is the usual relation between the particular market and the 
worldwide factor that caused the crash. Thus, a more extreme reaction to the  negative market shock 
should be expected in countries with high international co-movements. 
In order to determine the co-movement of each of the analysed EE countries’ equity returns 
with worldwide equity market returns, regression models were estimated. The time series of monthly 
returns on the World index was regressed on individual countries’ monthly returns from January 2003 
to October 2007. The beta coefficient in the model represents individual country beta and measures 
the sensitivity of a country’s index returns to changes in the World index returns. The results for the 
analysed sample are mixed (see appendix 1). Only in five out of the eleven countries the change in the 
World index value was a significant determinant of a country’s stock market returns. The values of 
the β coefficient, ranging from 2.03 to 1.21, show great sensitivity to worldwide market movements 
prior to the crisis in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia and Estonia. This can be explained 
by the higher degree of their capital markets’ integration with the world and greater dependence of 
these countries on the rest of the world. Equity market returns in all the other countries were not sig-
nificantly dependent on the world equity market returns. The percentage of variance in individual 
countries’ returns explained by the changes in the World index is much lower in EE countries – from 
44% in Poland to 15% in Russia - than in the USA, the UK or Europe (70-95%). This suggests still 
greater importance of country/ region specific variables for equity returns in the EE countries as com-
pared to the Western world. 
 
The impact of the crisis on Eastern European stock markets 
Figure 1 has shown the immediate reaction of the EMEE index to changes on world stock ex-
changes in the recent crisis. This section will provide a closer look at the individual countries’ reac-
tions to the crisis. 
Table 3 identifies peaks and troughs in the EE equity markets. Even though the duration of 
declines in individual markets was approximately the same, some differences between countries did 
exist. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the performance of the Emerging European stock markets be-
fore and during the crisis varied substantially from country to country. The US stock market index 
reached its highest level in October 2007, even though negative news from the banking sector had 
caused fluctuations already before that date. Bad news concerning subprime mortgage-backed securi-
ties came in February 2007 from HSBC. In July the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and the City Bank re-
signed and the Dow Jones index started falling. This caused an immediate reaction of several Eastern 
European indices, including Estonian, Hungarian, Romanian and Ukrainian. Most of the other EE 
markets followed them in subsequent months (after the fall of Northern Rock). The most resistant 
proved to be Russia and the Czech Republic. At the start of the global crisis it seemed that Russia 
would be a safe haven. Its stock market was growing rapidly, reaching its peak in May 2008. At the 
                                       
12 Euromoney. Country risk poll September 2007: Positive feeling, “Euromoney”, September 2007. 
13 R. Roll, The international crash of October 1987, “Financial Analysts Journal”, 1988, 44. R.G. Bowman, K. 
F. Chan, M.R. Comer, Contagion..., op.cit.  
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beginning of 2008 the effects of the crisis were already visible in the country. In the first quarter of 
the year it suffered a net capital outflow of $22.08 billion, which reversed the $20.8 billion inflow in 
the fourth quarter of 2007.
14 Certainly, there were several factors leading to the stock market crash in 
Russia. Yet, one of them was also the reason why Russia resisted so long. It was the country’s reli-
ance on oil.
15 Falling oil prices, among others, drove the Russian equity market down in June 2008 
showing the country’s vulnerability to external economic shocks. 
 
Table 3. Stock Markets’ Peaks and Troughs. 
Markets  Peak to trough 
Index change 
Before crisis  Peak to trough  Trough to 
current 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria  Oct. 2007-Feb.2009  66.52%  -88.88%  48.62% 
Czech Republic  Jun. 2008- Feb.2009  714.61%  -64.63%  81.12% 
Estonia  Jul. 2007-Nov. 2008  338.31%  -77.08%  12.01% 
Hungary  Jul. 2007- Feb. 2009  371.41%  -78.10%  121.12% 
Latvia  Sep. 2007-Feb. 2009  246.17%  -74.03%  32.99% 
Lithuania  Oct. 2007-Feb. 2009  761.22%  -74.59%  30.51% 
Poland  Oct. 2007-Feb.2009  392.44%  -76.30%  95.77% 
Romania  Jul. 2007-Feb. 2009  105.68%  -88.58%  143.36% 
Russia  May 2008-Feb. 2009  529.70%  -78.44%  75.78% 
Slovenia  Dec. 2007-Feb. 2009  429.77%  -67.27%  39.01% 
Ukraine  Jul. 2007-Feb. 2009  14.03%  -89.51%  70.32% 
Advanced economies 
USA  Oct. 2007-Feb. 2009  82.48%  -52.22%  34.06% 
UK  Oct. 2007-Feb. 2009  136.44%  -61.29%  40.70% 
Germany  Oct. 2007-Feb. 2009  255.90%  -61.59%  48.54% 
Source: MSCI Barra, NASDAQ OMX Baltic. 
Note: Peak is defined as the month when the index reached its highest level, trough when it reached the lowest 
level. The period of analysis is 31.01.2003-30.06.2009, except for: Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine for which 
the data starts on 30.06.2005, 30.12.2005, and 30.06.2006, respectively. 
 
The case of the Czech Republic is much different from that of Russia. Because of low interest 
rates the incentive to seek out foreign currency loans was much weaker in the country. It had a bal-
anced financial system financed by deposits rather than by foreign funds. This helped the Czech mar-
ket to defend itself against negative news from the world financial markets for a very long time. Inter-
estingly, not only was the duration of the crisis the shortest in the Czech Republic, but also the price 
drop of 64% from peak to trough was the most shallow in the region and comparable with what West-
ern countries experienced. This confirms the argument put forward in the previous section, that the 
countries with greater economic strength should suffer less.   
All of the analysed countries in the EE region enjoyed a period of substantial equity price in-
creases until the global crisis reached their markets. At their peaks Czech and Lithuanian stocks were 
worth seven times more than in January 2003. At the same time, US and UK equities had grown by 
only 82% and 136%. High rates of return had attracted more and more international investors before 
the global equity market slump. Yet, when the crisis hit Eastern Europe, investors in the region were 
also hit harder than the ones with portfolios in developed countries of Western Europe or America. 
While the latter experienced a 50-60% decrease in equity prices (from peak to trough), price falls in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine amounted to almost 90% of their peak values. The size of declines 
                                       
14 P. Lee, The credit crunch heads East: Russian banks prepare for a battle, “Euromoney”, 2 May 2008. 
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also results from overheating of the countries stock markets. The marginal contribution of domestic 
players to the stock market in Romania, for example, makes it dependent on the evolutions on the 
international markets. Political instability, the withdrawal of investors and great reliance on external 
funding to support domestic borrowing were the major factors that dragged the Ukrainian index down.  
Looking at the data until the end of July 2009 it seems that equity markets have rebounded from their 
troughs in February 2009 and have followed an upward trend since then. It means that investors are 
starting to come back to the region, which again offers higher returns than the Western markets. So 
far, indices have gained most in Romania, Hungary and Poland, while the equity markets in the Baltic 
countries, whose economies are struggling with deep recessions, have gone up only marginally.  
Diversification benefits  
In order to analyse diversification opportunities for a US investor in the Eastern European re-
gion, correlation coefficients with the US index were computed. Finally, through the application of 
portfolio theory, an attempt of identification of an optimum portfolio was made. 
  Correlations with the USA 
Pearson correlation coefficients of USD monthly returns for the 11 EE countries, the World 
index, EMEE index, the USA, and Europe are presented in appendix 2. Panel A presents correlation 
coefficients among the countries during the whole period of analysis. The table shows that significant 
and very high correlations existed among all of the analysed countries. From the perspective of a US 
investor, correlation was the lowest with Slovenian (0.52), Latvian (0.56), and Lithuanian (0.57) stock 
markets. It is also worth mentioning that the correlations were generally stronger between the US and 
Europe (0.92) than between the US and the individual EE markets. Appendix 3 plots the returns vs. 
standard deviations of returns in the analysed countries for the whole period. It shows that the EMEE 
portfolio does not dominate the other portfolios, while the Czech seems to be the dominant one. It had 
the highest returns and relatively low standard deviation as compared to other EE indices. 
As mentioned before, previous research documented that correlations between global stock 
market returns increase over time and are higher during crises. In panel B correlations before the cri-
sis, i.e. January 2003 to October 2007, are presented, and panel C contains correlation coefficients for 
the period from November 2007 to July 2009. A comparison of panels B and C clearly supports the 
findings of previous studies. Before the crisis, among all the correlation coefficients merely five were 
greater  than  0.70  (correlations  among  USA,  Europe  and  World,  as  well  as  correlations  between 
EMEE and Russia and Poland). Only the returns on Polish, Czech, Estonian and Hungarian equities 
were significantly correlated with US returns, with the relationship being medium to low. The crisis 
changed the situation dramatically. The correlations increased significantly not only for the US vs. EE 
countries but also among the countries in Eastern Europe. This is consistent with previous studies that 
found correlations between markets increasing during crises.
16 The high correlation coefficients sug-
gest that while in the period of high growth on EE stock markets they could offer potential diversifica-
tion benefits for US investors, those benefits largely disappeared with the outbreak of the subprime 
mortgage crisis. This can be supported by figures in appendices 4 and 5. Appendix 4 proves that coun-
tries like the Czech Republic, Lithuania or Slovenia offered much greater returns to investors than the 
developed world  markets.  Not surprisingly, the risk level of those investments was significantly 
higher. Still they could have been attractive for investors willing to accept the risk. Appendix 5 shows 
how the situation changed during the crisis. Most of the  EE indices (except for the Czech Republic 
and Hungary) experienced much higher losses than the World or US indices and at the same time their 
standard deviations were significantly higher. Moreover, the risk -return relationship of the Eastern 
European countries from November 2007 to July 2009  was negative. This confirms the “flight to 
quality” effect associated with the subprime crisis due to preference of foreign investors to invest in 
                                       
16 Mateus found that correlations of equity returns in the new EU member states were increasing particularly 
since they were declared on the “fast track” to the EU. T. Mateus, The risk and predictability of equity returns of 
the EU accession countries, “Emerging Markets Review”, 2004, 5.  
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safer developed markets at turbulent time periods.
17 Overall, the high correlation of capital markets in 
Eastern Europe with the developed world is the evidence of increased financial integra tion and im-
proved financial liberalisation in EE.   
  Finding the optimum portfolio 
The last part of the analysis focuses on the identification of potential gains for a US investor 
from investments in Emerging Europe. Two strategies are considered: the minimum variance portfolio 
and the optimum portfolio. Based on previous conclusions concerning increased correlation of the 
stock market returns in EE and the developed world, the hypothesis that diversification benefits for 
US investors in EE have disappeared will be tested. 
First, the Markowitz model was applied to identify the portfolio with the lowest anticipated 
risk (global minimum portfolio). Excluding short sales, this portfolio can be calculated by solving the 
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where Var(Rp) is the variance of portfolio returns, Cov(Ri,Rj) is the covariance of returns on index i 
and j, and xi, xj are portfolio weights. 
In the optimisation procedure the expected return was calculated using the Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model, where the return on one-month Treasury bills  was used as the risk free rate and the 
monthly risk premium of 0.43% was assumed. Table 4 reports the results from the Markowitz mean 
variance optimisation. It confirms that EE countries offer low diversification opportunities for US 
investors. The identified global minimum portfolio suggests that a risk-averse investor would have to 
invest 94.06% in US stocks, 3.4% and 2.54% in Latvian and Slovenian equities, respectively. This 
results from the very high correlation coefficients with the US for all of the EE countries, with Latvia 
and Slovenia having the lowest values and relatively low volatility. 
 
Table 4. Weights for Minimum Variance Portfolio and Optimal Portfolio. 
  Weights  Portfolio return  Portfolio risk  Return/ 
Standard deviation 
Global Minimum Portfolio 
Latvia  3.40%  0.53%  4.25  12.49% 
Slovenia  2.54%   
USA  94.06% 
Optimum Portfolio 
Latvia  3.03%  0.54%  4.35%  12.52% 
Slovenia  2.45%   
USA  66.34% 
World  28.17% 
 
                                       
17 J.F. Koeke, Institutional investment in Central and Eastern Europe: investment criteria of Western portfolio 
managers, ZEW Discussion Paper no. 99-37, Mannheim 1999, T. Mateus, The risk and predictability..., op.cit.  
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In the second step, the composition of the portfolio with the greatest ratio of excess return to 
standard  deviation  (Sharpe  ratio)  was  investigated.  The  strategy  of  selecting  the  portfolio  which 
maximises the anticipated Sharpe ratio can be viewed as an aggressive strategy as compared to mini-
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where S represents the Sharpe ratio and  f r is the risk-free rate of return. 
The identified tangency portfolio is very close to the minimum variance portfolio in terms of 
expected return and volatility. This time the World index was included with 28.17% share, together 
with a small portion of Latvian (3.03%) and Slovenian (2.45%) shares. This result implies that US 
investors with a more aggressive investment strategy should rather diversify through investments in 
the World portfolio than through including equity indices from EE countries. This supports the hy-
pothesis of disappearing diversification benefits in the region and is contrary to the findings of previ-
ous studies in the region. The results suggest that, on the one hand, the stock markets of the analysed 
countries have become more closely integrated with their Western neighbours, on the other, there is 
still a much higher level of risk related to equity investments in Emerging Europe. 
   
 
Conclusions 
The study provided an overview of the current developments on the stock markets of Eastern 
European countries with an attempt to investigate diversification opportunities for US investors in the 
region. The analysis leads to several conclusions. 
It is evident that Emerging Europe is not a homogenous region. There are clear differences 
between individual countries’ levels of stock market development and macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The equity markets in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be considered as leaders in the 
region in terms of size and liquidity. New EU member states and non-EU countries still need time and 
reforms to catch up with the rest of the group. To improve their resilience to external shocks they need 
to foster deeper and more liquid markets with diverse institutional investors, both domestic and for-
eign. Additionally, the stock markets of the latter group, i.e. Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine, 
were more vulnerable to the crisis due to poor economic fundamentals – high inflation, rapid credit 
growth or large current account deficits. This reveals the need to readdress the macroeconomic poli-
cies in the countries where the problems are most severe.  
The analysed stock markets in EE went through a period of rapid growth, especially after the 
accession of most of them to the EU. Joining the EU they had to integrate with Western Europe on 
various levels, which had important implications for their equity price development during the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. From January 2003 until July 2009 equity returns on all of the analysed mar-
kets were significantly and strongly correlated with the returns on the US stock index. Finally, the 
application of the mean variance approach and the optimum portfolio strategy has revealed that East-
ern Europe does not provide much diversification from the point of view of a US investor.  Appar-
ently, the returns on US stocks are much less risky than returns from the analysed Emerging markets.  
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Investors looking for the highest reward to volatility would be better off investing in the World port-
folio than in Eastern Europe. 
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Appendix 1. Average Monthly Returns and Market Regression Results (January 2003-October 2007).  







(β)  T  Adj. R
2 
Eastern Europe  
Bulgaria   29  0.019  0.049  0.518  1.185  0.014 
Czech Rep.  57  0.037  0.062  1.477  5.623  0.353 
Estonia   57  0.025  0.067  1.211  3.836  0.197 
Hungary  57  0.030  0.077  1.580  4.518  0.257 
Latvia  57  0.027  0.050  0.588  2.332  0.073 
Lithuania  57  0.041  0.071  0.768  2.101  0.057 
Poland  57  0.031  0.077  2.031  6.667  0.437 
Romania  22  0.033  0.082  0.893  1.095  0.009 
Russia  57  0.034  0.080  1.307  3.341  0.154 
Slovenia  57  0.030  0.058  0.465  1.548  0.024 
Ukraine  16  0.006  0.069  0.731  0.795  -0.023 
Other Indices 
USA  57  0.011  0.024  0.892  20.129  0.878 
UK  57  0.016  0.029  0.987  11.966  0.717 
Europe  57  0.018  0.033  1.176  38.821  0.951 
EMEE  57  0.032  0.067  1.509  5.081  0.307 
World  57  0.014  0.025     
Note: The period of analysis is 31.01.2003-30.06.2009, except for: Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine for which 
the data starts on 30.06.2005, 30.12.2005, and 30.06.2006, respectively. 
 
Appendix 2.  Correlations. 
Panel A: whole period 
   BG  CZ  EST  H  LV  LT  PL  RO  RUS  SLO  UA  USA  World  Europe  EMEE 
































































































































































































































**  1  
 
Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy „e-Finanse” 2010, vol. 6, nr 3 
www.e-finanse.com 
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie 




Panel B: before crisis 
   BG  CZ  EST  H  LV  LT  PL  RO  RUS  SLO  UA  USA  World  Europe  EMEE 
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Panel C: during crisis 
   BG  CZ  EST  H  LV  LT  PL  RO  RUS  SLO  UA  USA  World  Europe  EMEE 
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Appendix 5. Return vs. Standard Deviation – During Crisis. 
 
 
 